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In 1925 Reichenbach, by reacting to the positive result of Miller’s ether-drift experiments, introduced a distinction
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Introduction
The aspect of Reichenbach’s interpretation of special relativity that has attracted the most
attention is probably his famous conventionality of simultaneity—the freedom to choose which
events are simultaneous in a given inertial frame depending on the value of the parameter .
In a classical paper, David Malament (1977) has famously shown that one cannot allow such a
freedom if one believes—as Reichenbach did—in the causal theory of time. Malament’s paper,
the epitome of an influential work, has generated an enormous amount of discussion (cf. Janis,
2014, sec. 4 for an overview).
More recently, however, Robert Rynasiewicz (2003) has, as far I can see, rightly challenged
this view, showing that the non-standard definitions of simultaneity, though possible, play a
“disappointingly little [role]” (Rynasiewicz, 2003, 125) in Reichenbach’s formal construction (see
also Rynasiewicz, 2012). The present paper intends to show that, whatever stance one might take
about this matter, there is another aspect of Reichenbach’s interpretation of special relativity that
has gone unnoticed in recent literature, which is possibly more characteristic of his approach than
the -definition of simultaneity: Reichenbach’s distinction between two types of rod contractions
occurring in special relativity, the Lorentz and Einstein contractions.
Reichenbach introduced this distinction introduced this distinction in his discussion of Miller’s
experiment. In 1925 the American experimentalist Dayton C. Miller (1925a) published the results
of a series of Michelson-type experiments that he conducted at the top of Mount Wilson, in
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Southern California. Miller’s ‘scandalous’ detection of an ether-drift sparked, as one would expect,
considerable debate that well beyond the physics community about a possible refutation of special
relativity. The role of Miller experiment in the history of this experiment has been Einstein’s
attitude towards this experiment has been carefully investigated by Klaus Hentschel (1992).
The debate that ensued in the physics community, in particular in the American one has been
nicely presented by (Lalli, 2012). However, the philosophical reception of the experiment among
‘philosophers’ is still to be written. This paper will like to close this gap in the literature.
Reichenbach was the first to join the debate by publishing a paper the same year (Reichenbach,
1925), intending to demonstrate the physical implications of his axiomatization of special relativity.
The peculiarity of Reichenbach’s approach can be inferred from remarks that Moritz Schlick sent
to Einstein at the end of 1925 (Schlick to Einstein, Dec. 27, 1925; EA, 21-591; cf. Hentschel,
1990, 361f.). To his surprise, Schlick found conclusions in Reichenbach’s paper that could not
have been further from his own. Reichenbach did not believe that the Lorentz contraction was an
ad hoc hypothesis and that Einstein had dispelled (see Janssen, 2002, on this issue); he believed
the contraction needed a dynamical explanation based on a theory of matter in special relativity,
just like in Lorentz’s theory. Thus Schlick realized that for Reichenbach there were no differences
between Lorentz and Einstein’s theories, and therefore no conventional choice between them.
Moreover, the acceptance of Miller’s results would not have implied a return to the old ether theory.
By reading Schlick’s letter, one is immediately disabused of the conviction that Reichenbach’s
axiomatization was a mathematically sophisticated version of Schlick’s conventionalist reading of
special relativity.
Reichenbach’s line of argument was based on the above mentioned distinction between ‘Lorentz
contraction’ and ‘Einstein contraction,’ which would resurface in his major 1928 monograph
(Reichenbach, 1928). In a slightly updated parlance, one can say that the Lorentz contraction
compares the proper length of a moving rod in special relativity with the length that the rod
would have had in the classical theory; the Einstein contraction compares the proper length of a
relativistic rod with its coordinate length in a moving frame. The first contraction implies a real
difference and requires a molecular-atomistic explanation in both Einstein and Lorentz’s theories.
The second contraction is a perspectival difference that depends on the definition of simultaneity.
Reichenbach holds the controversial opinion that only the first contraction is necessary to explain
the Michelson experiment.
The aim of this paper to show how it was Reichenbach’s reaction to Miller’s experiment
that prompted him to introduce this distinction. Section 1 of this paper presents a sketch of
Reichenbach’s axiomatization of special relativity, which is indispensable to understanding his
line of argument. Section 2 introduces the distinction between Lorentz and Einstein contractions.
Section 3 shows how Reichenbach uses the distinction to provide a philosophical account of
Miller’s experiment. Section 3 follows Reichenbach’s ‘geometrization’ of the opposition between
Lorentz/Einstein-contraction in terms of Minkowski diagrams, as presented in his 1928 book. The
paper concluded by showing, that Reichenbach’s distinction was resurrected by Adolf Grünbaum
in the 1950s, that use it against Karl Popper’s claim that the Lorentz contraction was not
falsifiable.
Nevertheless, it was Reichenbach who must be credited for having attempted to show that the
Lorentz-Einstein relationship should not be understood along the lines of the ad hoc/non ad-hoc
distinction. According Reichenbach both theories attempt to account for an odd coincidence, that
matter and fields contract in the same way (that is in Reichenbach’s parlance the light geometry
and matter geometry agree). Lorentz explained the difference as a deviation from a standard
behavior for rods and clocks. Einstein, by contrast refused to give an explanation and simply
declared that the relativistic behavior to be the natural behavior of rods and clocks. According
to Reichenbach, however, an explanation is needed in Einstein theory as well. Surprisingly,
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in Reichenbach’s view the explanation is not to be searched in the geometrical structure of
space-time (Janssen, 2009), but in a theory of the material structure of rods and clocks. In this
sense, Reichenbach approach appears as a curious anticipation of a neo-Lorentzian approach to
special relativity Brown (2005).
1 Reichenbach’s Axiomatization and the Role of the Michelson Experiment
On September 17, 1921 Reichenbach wrote to Moritz Schlick that in a few days he was going
to present his project of an axiomatization of special relativity in Jena, at the meeting of the
Association of the German Natural Scientists and Physicians (Reichenbach to Schlick, Sep. 17,
1921; SN). As he went on to explain to Einstein immediately thereafter, the main ambition of
the project was to show that in special relativity “one can get along without rigid rods and
material clocks” by using only light rays (Einstein to Reichenbach, Oct. 12, 1921; CPAE, Vol. 12,
Doc. 266). Reichenbach’s first sketch of his axiomatization project was published in the same
year (Reichenbach, 1921). Reichenbach sent it to on at the beginning of 1922, warning that,
although the paper was inspired by conventionalism, its results “reveals those facts that also
conventionalism cannot interpret” (Reichenbach to Schlick, Jan. 18, 1922; SN); however Schlick
was initially impressed that in Reichenbach’s approach one could avoid the use not just of rods,
but also clocks (Schlick to Reichenbach, Jan. 27, 1922; SN).
Reichenbach was moved by the conviction that complicated structures such as rods and clocks
should be introduced at “the end of a physical theory, not at its beginning”, since a “knowledge of
their mechanisms presupposes a knowledge of the physical laws” (Reichenbach, 1922, 365; tr. 1978,
41) . Einstein also appreciated Reichenbach’s efforts in this area (Einstein to Reichenbach,
Mar. 27, 1922; CPAE, Vol. 13, Doc. 119). However, on May 10, 1922, Hermann Weyl alerted
Reichenbach of major shortcomings in his approach: the class of inertial frames could not be
singled out by using light rays alone (HR, 015-68-02). Reichenbach only papered over the cracks
of Weyl’s objection (Rynasiewicz, 2005) in the final version of his axiomatization, which was
finished in March of 1923. After some difficulties finding a publisher, Reichenbach’s monograph
came out the following year (Reichenbach, 1924).
However, the book received a lukewarm, if even hostile reception. Schlick’s student Edgar
Zilsel reviewed the book positively for the Die Naturwissenschaften (Schlick to Reichenbach, May
7, 25; SN). However, he seemed to have considered Reichenbach’s work simply a mathematically
refined version of Schlick’s conventionalism (Zilsel, 1925). However, it was in particular, a
dismissive review by Weyl (1924), with whom Reichenbach had been on good terms, which clearly
struck a hard blow. Reichenbach would still remember the episode with bitterness a decade later
(Reichenbach to Einstein, Apr. 12, 1936; EA, 10-107). Thus it is unsurprising that Reichenbach
rushed to defend his work. On July 28, 1925 the Zeitschrift für Physik received a paper from him,
which was meant to clarify some technical issues with his project, and more importantly to plea
for its philosophical relevance, to “expand upon those consequences which are especially important
for physics” (Reichenbach, 1925, 32; tr. 2006, 171). The paper is relatively self-contained and
provides a simplified presentation of Reichenbach’s axiomatization, which we can roughly follow
here (see Ryckman, 2005, sec. 4.4.2).
As is well known, Reichenbach’s axiomatization differs from the typical ‘deductive axiomatiza-
tion’ championed by, e.g., David Hilbert (Corry, 2004). In the latter, one sets an abstract general
principle as an axiom, such as a variational principle (see Reichenbach, 1924, 2). Reichenbach,
in contrast, put forward a ‘constructive axiomatization.’ As axioms he set empirical assertions
capable of experimental verification. Reichenbach then derived the entire theory from them by
integrating some additional conceptual elements, i.e., definitions. The definitions, a type he called
‘coordinative definitions,’ are arbitrary, thus neither true nor false. Einstein’s famous definition of
3
simultaneity is, in Reichenbach’s view, a definition of this type. It amounts to the stipulation that
when light signals are sent from a source to a mirror at relative rest and back again, the one-way
time is  = 1/2 of the round-trip time. In principle, however, every value 0 <  < 1 can be chosen.
Reichenbach’s ‘constructive axiomatization’ consisted of ten axioms, five concerning the
behavior of light (Lichtaxiome or light axioms, I-IV), and five concerning rods and clocks
(Körperaxiome or matter axioms, VI-X).
– The light axioms define the equality of spatial and temporal distances for individual frames
(Lichtgeometrie or light-geometry) using light rays alone. In Reichenbach’s view the light
axioms in special relativity do not differ from those in classical theory except for the assertion
that the velocity of light is the velocity’s upper limit. The relativistic light-geometry claims
that light propagates in spherical waves in any uniformly moving system, whereas in the
the classical light-geometry light propagates in spherical waves only in the ether system.
The difference depends on the choice of , which is in principle arbitrary.
– The matter axioms postulate that material systems used as rods and clocks behave in
accordance with the light geometry (Körpergeometrie or matter-geometry). Space distances
and time intervals that are light-geometrically equal will also turn out to be equal if measured,
respectively, with rigid rods and ideal clocks. Thus the content of special relativity can be
expressed by saying that rods and clocks behave according to the relativistic light-geometry
and not according to the classical one. In other terms, the Lorentz transformation, which
leaves the spherical propagation of light invariant, turns out to be the transformation for
measuring rods and clocks. If rods transformed according to the Galileian transformations,
distances traveled by light in equal times would in general not be equal if measured by rods.
Figure 1: Reichenbach’s stylized Michelson-
Morley apparatus (from Reichenbach, 1926b, la-
bels have been changed)
Thus, in Reichenbach’s axiomatization, the
matter axioms contained the part of relativity
theory that can be tested empirically. The only
relativistic axiom that was actually put to ex-
perimental verification, according to Reichen-
bach, was Axiom VIII: “Two intervals which
are equal when measured by rigid rods, are also
light-geometrically equal” (Reichenbach, 1924,
69; tr. 1969, 89). This amounts to nothing
but an abstract formulation of the Michelson-
Morley experiment. In an article published
some months later (Reichenbach, 1926a), Rei-
chenbach provided a good schematic descrip-
tion of Michelson’s experimental setting (fig. 1),
which we can roughly follow here.
As is well known, the essential idea of the
experiment was to split a beam of light at O,
allow the two resultant beams to travel along
two rigid rods placed at a right angle, with
two mirrors M1 and M2 at the end points
of the arm where the beams will be reflected
back. The light beams are recombined at O to
produce a series of interference fringes. What
has to be experimentally tested is whether the
travel time of a light signal going back and forth between two mirrors depends on whether the
arms are parallel or perpendicular to the direction of motion. If the travel time along the two
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paths should change when the instrument is rotated, one should observe a shift of the interference
fringes (Reichenbach, 1926b, 325; tr. 2006, 195f.).
According to the ether theory, the two light beams would return at the same time only if
the apparatus is at rest with respect to the ether; but since the apparatus moves along with the
Earth through space, the theory demands a deviation: the ray reaching M2 must return slightly
later, producing a change in the interference pattern. Thus, by measuring interference patterns,
one could determine the state of motion of the Earth relative to the ether. In the 1880s Albert
A. Michelson (1881), later with the assistance of Edward W. Morley (1887), showed that “in
spite of the extreme precision of the measurement, there is no difference in the time to traverse
either arm of the apparatus” (Reichenbach, 1926b, 326; tr. 2006, 195). At the turn of the century,
“Morley and Miller [1905a,b] replicated this negative result in spite of the renewed increase in
precision” (Reichenbach, 1926b, 326; tr. 2006, 195; translation modified).
How does one explain this negative result? Reichenbach told the following well-known story:
“Lorentz in Leyden presented his explanation that assumed that all rigid bodies moving in
opposition to the ether undergo a contraction” (Reichenbach, 1926b, 325; tr. 2006, 197). Lorentz
justified the contraction hypothesis on the grounds that the molecular forces that hold material
bodies together are of electromagnetic nature and are affected by translational motion. On
the contrary, “in 1905, a more basic explanation was proposed by A. Einstein in which these
contractions occur as a result of a universal principle, the principle of relativity” (Reichenbach,
1926b, 326; tr. 2006, 197). Thus Einstein could remain agnostic about the ultimate constitution
of matter and only require the Lorentz covariance of all physical laws, including the unknown
ones governing the material constitution of rods and clocks.
This, of course, can be cast in Reichenbach’s own axiomatization, but as we shall see, this
leads to some non-mainstream philosophical conclusions. Axiom VIII claims that two intervals
OM1 and OM2 (fig. 1) are equal when measured in terms of the equality of the time intervals of
the round trip of the light signals (OM1O = OM2O); then they are also equal when measured by
rigid rods (M1 = M2). The Michelson experiment put to the test this correspondence postulated
by axiom VIII, and the result was usually accepted as correct. In particular, it received further
confirmation in the work of Rudolf Tomaschek (1924), an anti-relativist, who, inspired by Philipp
Lenard, had repeated the experiment interferometer experiment using the light of fixed stars
(Reichenbach, 1925, 39; tr. 2006, 180).
However, Reichenbach pointed out that “[r]ecently, doubts have been raised by Dayton
C. Miller, who obtained a positive result on Mount Wilson” (Reichenbach, 1925, 39; tr. 2006,
180). If Miller’s experiment were to be confirmed, then the round-trip times of the light signals
along the two arms would become unequal (OM1O 6= OM2O). Therefore the matter-geometrical
equality of distances would no longer coincide with the light-geometrical equality, and Axiom
VIII would be disproved.
There was no agreement at the time on the reliability of Miller’s results. Reichenbach, however,
was quick to take advantage of the debate following the publication of Miller’s paper, in order
to convince the numerous skeptics of the physical implications of his axiomatization: “In this
context, the axiomatization is proved to be extremely useful because it shows what particular
role the Michelson experiment plays in the theory, what follows from it, and what is independent
of it” (Reichenbach, 1925, 39; tr. 2006, 180).
2 Einstein Contraction vs. Lorentz Contraction: The First Appearance of Reichen-
bach’s Distinction
Before entering into an analysis of Miller’s experiment, Reichenbach made some remarks about
the philosophical interpretation of special relativity, which, I think, are quite puzzling at first
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glance. Reichenbach warned his readers not to subscribe uncritically to a common interpretation
of special relativity:
[W]e should examine a particular error that has crept into the understanding of the theory
of relativity. It concerns the problem of Lorentz contraction and thereby leads us to the
Michelson experiment. One frequently hears the opinion expressed that in the Lorentzian
explanation of the Michelson experiment the contraction of the arms of the apparatus is
an ‘ad hoc hypothesis,’ whereas Einstein explains it in a most natural way, namely, as a
result of the relativization of the concept of simultaneity. But this is false. The relativity of
simultaneity has nothing to do with length contraction in the Michelson experiment. That
this opinion is false already follows from the fact that the contraction of one of the arms of
the apparatus occurs precisely in the system in which the apparatus is at rest (Reichenbach,
1925, 43; tr. 2006, 187; my emphasis).
As we have mentioned, in order to explain the negative result of the Michelson experiment,
Lorentz made the assumption that one arm of the apparatus is contracted by the amount√
1− v2/c2 when it moves relative to the ether. The theoretical asymmetry between the ether
frame and those moving with respect to it is hidden from observation by a sort of universal
conspiracy of nature. Einstein, on the contrary, considered both arms equally long, if measured at
relative rest in the rest system, but one arm would appear contracted by the factor
√
1− v2/c2
if measured from a moving system. In this way, the theoretical symmetry between the rest
and moving system is reestablished. This of course was the consequence of the fact that the
definition of the simultaneity of distant clocks using light signals is frame dependent. As any
length measurement requires that both ends of the rod be measured at the same time, two
observers in relative motion refer to something different when they talk about the length of the
arm of the apparatus.
Reichenbach, however, explicitly rejected this standard interpretation, which he himself
had defended not much earlier (Reichenbach, 1922). Let’s take a look at Reichenbach’s own
explanation:
That this opinion is false already follows from the fact that the contraction of one of the
arms of the apparatus occurs precisely in the system in which the apparatus is at rest. The
‘Einstein contraction’ only explains that the arm is shortened if it is measured from a different
system. But that does not explain the Michelson experiment. [The latter] proves that the
rod lying in the direction of motion is shorter when measured in the rest system than it
should be according to the classical theory. [. . .] [T]he Einsteinian theory, as well as Lorentz’s,
differs from the classical theory in asserting a measurably different effect on rigid rods that
has nothing to do with the definition of simultaneity (Reichenbach, 1925, 43–44; tr. 2006,
187–188; translation modified; my emphasis).
Let’s assume that there is a special ether system at absolute rest in which there are two equally
long rigid rods, one of which behaves according to classical theory and the other to Einstein’s
theory; if we set the system in motion, then the two rods would cease to be equally long provided
that they lie along the direction of the motion. The Lorentz-Einstein rod would be shorter than
the classical rod. The difference could in principle be measured in the moving system itself as the
difference between the rest-lengths of the classical and Lorentz-Einstein rods. Thus a comparison
with length in another system is not at stake.
To avoid confusion, Reichenbach suggested that it is necessary to distinguish between: (a) the
Einstein contraction, which results from the relativity of simultaneity and compares the length
of the moving rod with the length of the rod at rest in the same Lorentz-Einstein theory; and
(b) the Lorentz contraction, which compares the length of the same rod lying in the direction of
motion in different theories—classical mechanics and the Lorentz-Einstein theory. In the classical
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theory the coordinate length of the moving rod is expected to be just as the coordinate length of
the rod at rest. In the Lorentz-Einstein theory, by contrast, the coordinate length of a moving
rod is always shorter than its proper length which is the same in all inertial frames. Nevertheless,
Reichenbach claims, the proper length of a rod in motion can still be said to be shorter than the
length that a classical rod would have if both were measured at relative rest in the moving frame
(Giannoni, 1971).
Reichenbach uses the following notation. Let’s call l a rod that behaves according to the
Lorentz-Einstein theory and L a rod that behaves according to the classical theory. Let’s label K
the rest system and K ′ the moving system. The rest lengths of l and L in K are equal, or, as
Reichenbach put it, lKK = LKK . In his notation the upper index refers to the system in which the
rod is measured and the lower refers to the one in which the rod is at rest. Thus the rest-length
of a moving rod from the perspective of a co-moving frame, in other terms its proper length, is
lK
′
K′ ; the length of a rest-rod from the perspective of the moving frame lK
′
K is its coordinate length.
Now let’s consider what happens in the system K ′ that is in uniform motion with respect to K.
The Lorentz contraction is concerned with the ratio lK′K′ : LK
′
K′ , whereas the Einstein contraction
is concerned with the ratio lKK′ : lKK . That is, the Lorentz contraction compares the behavior of
the same rod in the Lorentz-Einstein and classical theories in the same inertial system K ′. The
Einstein contraction compares the behavior of two rods in the Lorentz-Einstein theory in different
inertial systems, K and K ′. The Einstein contraction depends on the relativity simultaneity and
“is related to the comparison of different magnitudes within the same theory” (Reichenbach, 1925,
44; tr. 2006, 188) (coordinate and proper length). An analogous example would be the annual
parallax, the difference in the position of a star as seen from two different extremes of the Earth’s
orbit. The Lorentz contraction is related to “the behavior of the same magnitudes according to
different theories” (Reichenbach, 1925, 45; tr. 2006, 188) (the classical and relativistic proper
length). An analogy to this would be the difference between the gravitational light deflection,
which in general relativity is twice the Newtonian value.
According to Reichenbach, only the Lorentz contraction is at stake in the Michelson experiment,
not the Einstein contraction: “It just happens that both contractions depend upon the same
measurement factor 1/
√
1− ~v2/c2, and this is probably the reason why they are always confused
with one another” (Reichenbach, 1925, 46; tr. 2006, 189). Reichenbach shows that the equality
lK
′
K′ : LK
′
K′ = lKK′ : lKK is simply a consequence of the linearity of transformation. However, one
should not miss the deep conceptual difference between the two contractions, which is hidden
behind the coincidental numerical equality of the two factors (Reichenbach, 1925, 45f.; tr. 2006,
189f.). Thus in Reichenbach’s view, it is not advisable to use the same expression ‘contraction’ in
both cases.
It is this very expression ‘contraction’ that Reichenbach finds misleading. It implies that
physical objects satisfy the classical theory without a cause, so that one must search for a cause
for deviations from the correct behavior. However, there is no reason to see the classical theory
as natural, and the Lorentz-Einstein theory as a distortion. The problem of causality should be
posed in a different form; one must explain why measuring rods and clocks conform to a certain
set of transformations defined in terms of the light-geometry and not to a different one. This
causal problem is the same whether the rods and clocks behave according to the relativistic or
classical transformation. In his 1924 monograph (Reichenbach, 1924, 70–71; tr. 1969, 90-91), we
already find Reichenbach using Weyl’s expression ‘adjustment’ as a good way to express this
peculiar form of causality.
As Reichenbach explains, Weyl (1920) had introduced the expression ‘adjustment’ to account
for the surprising behavior of the physical systems, such as atoms, that we use as rods and
clocks. It cannot be a coincidence that atoms of the same type always have the same Bohr radius,
independent of what happened to them in the past; this fact suggests that each time, they ‘adjust’
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anew to a certain equilibrium value, rather then ‘preserve’ it. The analogy with special relativity
seems to be the following: “Einstein’s idea can be formulated as meaning that light geometry and
matter geometry are identical” (Reichenbach, 1924, 11; tr. 1969, 14). It is an odd coincidence that
any physical system we use as a rod—whether it is made of steel, wood, etc.—always measures at
equal lengths that are light-geometrically equal. “Light is a much simpler physical object than a
material rod, and, when searching for a relation between the two, it should be initially supposed
that it would not correspond to so ideal a scheme as the posited matter axioms” (Reichenbach,
1925, 47-48; tr. 2006, 95). This coincidence cries out for an explanation. However, the explanation
should not account for the divergence from an alleged correct behavior, but a for the convergence
toward a non-trivial one:
The word adjustment, first used in this way by Weyl, is a very good characterization of the
problem. [. . .] [A]ll metrical relations between material objects, including the observed fact
of the Michelson experiment, must therefore be explained in terms of the particular way
in which rigid rods adjust to the movement of light. Of course, the answer can only arise
from a detailed theory of matter about which we have not the least idea [. . .] [.] The word
‘adjustment’ here thus only means a problem without providing an answer; the relevant fact
is strictly formulated in the matter axioms without using the word ‘adjustment.’ Once we
have this theory of matter, we can explain the metrical behavior of material objects; but
at present the explanation from Einstein’s theory is as poor as Lorentz’s or the classical
terminology (Reichenbach, 1925, 46–47; tr. 2006, 191).
Figure 2: The Results of Miller’s Experiment
(from Reichenbach, 1926b)
According to Reichenbach, the difference
between Lorentz and Einstein’s theories is not
in their empirical content, but in the types
of explanation they provide. Both assert the
facts encoded in axiom VIII, whereas the clas-
sical theory denies them. However, Lorentz’s
theory assumes the classical behavior of rods
as ‘self-evident,’ so that any deviation from
these relations must have a cause. Einstein’s
theory renounces the explanation and axiomat-
ically defines two rods as equal if they behave
in accordance with the Michelson experiment.
“The superiority of Einstein’s theory lies in
the recognition of the epistemological legiti-
macy of this procedure” (Reichenbach, 1928,
233; tr. 1958, 202). However, according to
Reichenbach, Einstein’s agnosticism is unsat-
isfying. Without a suitable theory of matter
describing those physical systems we happen
to use as rods and clocks, Einstein’s account
of the metrical behavior of material objects is
“just as poor as Lorentz’s” (Reichenbach, 1925,
43; tr. 2006, 187).
3 Reichenbach on Miller’s Experiment
After Reichenbach clarified the distinction between Lorentz and Einstein contraction, he could
proceed further to show what would happen if a Michelson-type experiment gave a positive result.
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As we have mentioned, in those years, raising this issue was more than just a mental exercise. A
few months before the publication of Reichenbach’s paper, Miller had published the result of his
Mount Wilson experiments (Miller, 1925a).
Miller had begun working with Morley on the detection of the ether drift twenty years before,
and they had published a null result (Morley and Miller, 1905a,b, 1907). The observations were
made on slightly elevated locations and had indicated the occurrence of a small displacement.
Miller conjectured it was significant. He remounted the Morley-Miller apparatus at a higher
elevation at the Mount Wilson Observatory in 1921, moved it to Cleveland in 1922 (Miller, 1922),
then back to Mount Wilson at 1734 metres above sea level in 1924. There Miller found a positive
displacement of the interference fringes, approximately 10km/s, such as would be produced by
a relative motion of the Earth and the ether (instead of the nearly 30 km/s expected). This
suggested a partial drag of the ether by the Earth, which decreases with altitude (Miller, 1925a).
Miller’s result immediately sparked considerable debate in the physics community. On May
23, 1926 the polish-born physicist Ludwik Silberstein (author of one the first special-relativistic
textbooks) published an announce in Nature claiming that Miller’s result refute special relativity
and support Stokes-Planck theory based on the idea on a compressible ether (Silberstein, 1925).
Arthur Stanley Eddington the major relativist in the English speaking world, replied on June
6, 1925 attacking Miller’s result: if the ether drag depended on altitude, then also astronomical
observations should be different on Mount Wilson respect to that on sea level (Eddington, 1925a).
A few week later, at the end of July, Reichenbach was the first ‘philosopher’ to attempt to
participate to the debate, that he clearly saw as a good opportunity to convince the numerous
skeptics of the validity of his axiomatic. Reichenbach’s reaction reveals that the implications of
Einstein’s experiment were clearly non-mainstream:
Now we can also address the question what would change in the theory of relativity if Miller’s
experiment were held to prove that the hitherto negative result of the Michelson experiment
is in principle wrong. Nothing would change in Einstein’s theory of time as it has nothing
to do with the Michelson experiment. Also nothing would change with the light geometry;
it remains in any case a possible definition for the space-time metric and probably a much
better and more accurate one than the geometry of rigid rods and natural clocks. But
what would change is our knowledge about the adjustments of material things to the light
geometry. With respect to the matter axioms, as far as they differ from the classical theory,
the Michelson experiment is the only one that has been confirmed. If this should be refuted,
one has to develop a more complex view of the relationship between material objects and
the light geometry (Reichenbach, 1925, 47; tr. 2006, 192; my emphasis).
In Reichenbach’s axiomatization, the Michelson result is summarized in Axiom VIII. Thus, in
the event that Miller’s experimental results were not spurious, only this axiom would change. The
principle of the constancy of the speed of light could be maintained, since it depends on a definition;
thus one could construct a ‘light geometry’ using light signals but employing no rigid rods. “From
this perspective, the Michelson experiment serves only as a bridge [Verbindungsgliedes] between
the light geometry and the geometry of rigid rods” (Reichenbach, 1925, 327-328; tr. 2006, 203).
If the experiment were rejected, this would only mean that “rigid rods do not after all possess
the preferred properties that Einstein still attributes to them” (Reichenbach, 1925, 328; tr. 2006,
203). However, this would not imply a return to the old ether theory, but only a change in
the matter axioms. Whereas the light axioms are completely certain, the matter axioms make
statements about very complicated material structures. In Reichenbach’s view they might have
the “the validity of a first-order approximation in the same way that the ideal gas law cannot be
maintained if the accuracy is increased” (Reichenbach, 1925, 48; tr. 2006, 192).
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4 Schlick’s Reaction to Reichenbach’s Paper
Einstein drew very different consequences from Miller’s experiment. Two days before Reichenbach’s
paper was submitted to the , on June 26, 1925, Edwin E. Slosson, the executive editor and
director of the Science Service asked Einstein for a comment. Einstein’s opinion at that time is
clearly expressed by a letter sent a few days later to Robert A. Millikan, Caltech’s ‘chairman
of the executive council’: if the Miller’s result turned out be correct, Einstein wrote, then “the
whole theory of relativity would go down like a house of cards” (Einstein to Millikan, Jul. 13,
1925; EA, 17-357). A few days later, Einstein sent a very similar statement to Slosson which was
published on Science on July 31, 1925. Against Silberstein’s claim the Miller’s results support
the Planck-Stoke theory, Einstein argued that they would mean a return to Lorentz’s theory:
“No theory exists outside of the theory of relativity and the similar Lorentz theory which, except
for the Miller experiment, explains all the known phenomena up to date” (Slosson, 1925).
In general however physicists expressed serious doubts, including Millikan and his group at
Caltech (Epstein to Einstein, Jul. 25, 1925; EA, 10-565). Einstein himself, in spite of the openness
that he showed in his public statement, was however not convinced at all that Miller’s experiment
was reliable. As, he wrote to Paul Ehrenfest in August 1925 “Auf das Miller-Experiment halte ich
im Grund meiner schwarzen Seele nichts, nur darf ich es nicht laut sagen” (Einstein to Ehrenfest,
Aug. 18, 1925; EA, 10-108). Einstein’s skepticism, just like Eddington’s, was motivated by the
fact that a difference in height between Cleveland und Mount Wilson was not enough to explain
Miller’s results. In September 1925, Einstein suggested that a temperature difference (Einstein to
Piccard, Sep. 21, 1925; EA, 19-211), and he communicated his results to Miller, who, by the end
of the year, published a more detailed account of the experiment (Miller, 1925b).
In this context, it is not surprising that Reichenbach’s quite different attitude towards Miller’s
results could appear puzzling. At the end of 1925, Schlick expressed disconcert in his correspon-
dence with Einstein (Schlick to Einstein, Dec. 26, 1925; EA, 21-591). “Mr. Reichenbach” he
wrote “has recently published a paper ‘Über die physikalischen Konsequenzen der relativistischen
Axiomatik’ in the Zeitschrift für Physik”; Schlick was eager to know Einstein’s opinion, since
the paper “quite clearly shows the limit of the axiomatic method”weil sie ziemlich deutlich die
Grenzen der axiomatischen Methode zu zeigen scheint (Schlick to Einstein, Dec. 26, 1925; EA,
21-591).
Schlick was understandably confused by Reichenbach’s claim that the Lorentz contraction
is not ad hoc; after all, this had been Schlick’s reading of special relativity for at least a
decade (Schlick, 1915). Actually Reichenbach’s paper, by attacking a not further identified
mainstream interpretation of special relativity, seems to have attacked more or less explicitly
Schlick’s interpretation. Schlick had still recently defended it at the Leipzig meeting Gesellschaft
Deutscher Naturforscher und Ärzte to which Reichenbach also took part (Schlick, 1923). As is well
known, Schlick considered Lorentz and Einstein’s theory as empirically equivalent, that is equally
consistent with all experiential data. However, whereas Lorentz theory introduces compensatory
contractions and retardations, Einstein theory avoid the introduction of redundant elements, and
it is thus preferable. Lorentz’s theory, in Schlick’s view, is analogous to the attempt of saving
Euclidean geometry, by adding a force field deforming all measuring instruments. The difference
is not a matter, of truth, but a matter of simplicity. As we as seen, within the Schlick’s circle
Reichenbach’s axiomatic was initially received as a more sophisticated presentation of this point
of view. However, Schlick now realized that Reichenbach had something very different in mind:
The reflection on p. 43 [. . .] show in my opinion that his axiomatic cannot distinguish
between special relativity and Lorentz’s theory (with the contraction hypothesis) which
seems to me obvious since the equations are the same. The real difference between the two
theories is a philosophical one and cannot be grasped in the logical way of the axiomatic.
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This difference can be aptly expressed through the parlance that Reichenbach rejects. It
is a an ad hoc hypothesis. Even if, from a logical point of view, spec. rel. theory must
make as many assumptions as Lorentz’s one. In the first case they ... in the framework of
and the contraction hypothesis is psychologically really not ad hoc, while in the case of the
Lorentz-Fitzgerald is a piece added ad hoc..
The limits of Reichenbach’s approach, according to Schlick, emerge even more clearly from
Reichenbach’s reaction to Miller’s experiment. If the experiment were to be confirmed, Schlick
argued, the universal conspiracy of nature that hide the aether from detection would be broken
and we had to return to the ether theory. By contrast, Reichenbach’s Axiomatic method is
incapable to grasp the difference between the two cases:
Also the paper’s remark—about the possible interpretation of Miller’s experiments—does
not seem to be to grasp the philosophical key point. If the experiments would really prove
(and this is surely not the case), that a particular direction (that of the ‘aether wind’) were
privileged, one would certainly abandon the relativistic physics; even if it were possible to
keep relativity through the assumption of certain ‘matter axioms,’ one would certainly not
take this path. Against this the axiomatic consideration remains indifferent. In the strict
sense one cannot speak of physical consequences of the axiomatic. The question seems to me
philosophically relevant, I would be deeply grateful if you could tell me in a few lines if I’m
right.
Unfortunately, Einstein did not comply Schlick’s request and he probably never read Reichen-
bach’s paper. However, as we have seen, there is no doubt that Einstein’s position was closer to
that of Schlick.
Einstein had defined the contraction hypothesis as ad hoc (Einstein, 1908, 1915), provoking
Lorentz’s reaction Lorentz to Einstein, Jan. 23, 1915; CPAE, Vol. 8, Doc. 43. Also concering
Miller’s experiment, Einstein clearly agreed with Schlick (Hentschel, 1990, 361f.)). On January
19, 1926 a brief, but unequivocal statement of Einstein was published in the at that time most
influential German newspaper, the Vossiche Zeitung: “If the results of Miller’s experiments should
indeed be confirmed, the relativity theory could not be upheld” (Einstein, 1926) . Einstein was
clearly convinced the Miller’s result were probably spurious, and he was ready to put money
where its mouth was, as he explicitly phrase it (Einstein, 1926). However, he had no doubt that, if
Miller’s experiments turned out to be correct, the relativity principle would have to be abandoned
entirely (Hentschel, 1992). This hardly surprising. In Einstein’s view, the construction of a device
detecting the ether-drift would have been comparable to the construction of a perpetuum mobile
of the second kind þ. This the empirical principle on which the entire theory stands or falls.
A few months later, Reichenbach submitted a popular paper on the Miller’s experiment
entitled “Ist die Relativitätstheorie widerlegt?” which appeared in the weekly magazine Die
Umschau on April 24, 1926. By that time, Reichenbach was fully aware of what “Einstein himself
has recently said in the newspapers,”; however, he saw no reason to abandon his “less radical
opinion” (Reichenbach, 1926b, 327; tr. 2006, 202), namely that “Miller’s result in no way affects
the philosophical consequences of the theory of relativity” (Reichenbach, 1926b, 328; tr. 2006,
203; my emphasis). It would only imply a change in our knowledge of the physical mechanism
governing rods and clocks (Hentschel, 1982, 308).
Reichenbach too expressed some doubts about the correctness of Miller’s experiment. The curve
determined by Miller deviates from the expected symmetry with respect to the horizontal axis
(fig. 2). J. Weber (1926) showed that Miller’s figure omits some quite problematic measurement
data without explanation. It was unlikely that on Mount Wilson, which after all is merely 0.03%
of the Earth’s radius, one would detect an ether wind 1/3 less than expected (Thirring, 1926).
Moreover, Rudolf Tomaschek (1925, 1926), an anti-relativist, performed the so-called Röntgen-
Eichenwald and Trouton-Noble experiments and obtained negative results on the Jungfraujoch in
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the Bernese Alps. Thus, it would have been interesting to replicate a Michelson-type experiment
on the Jungfraujoch before drawing further conclusions.
However, the philosophical point of course lied elsewhere: “What then does the theory of
relativity have to infer from Miller’s experiment?” (Reichenbach, 1926b, 327; tr. 2006, 202).
Concerning this point, Reichenbach was not afraid to express an opinion that radically differed
from that of Einstein. Somehow anticipating his later famous distinction between the context of
discovery and the context of justification, Reichenbach claimed that “[t]he Michelson experiment,
of course, played a crucial role in the historical development of the theory” (Reichenbach, 1926b,
327; tr. 2006, 202; my emphasis)1; however, according to Reichenbach, “it does not occupy this
same significant place in the relativistic theory’s logical structure” (Reichenbach, 1926b, 327;
tr. 2006, 202; my emphasis).
The logical structure of the theory was of course expressed by Reichenbach’s own axiomatiza-
tion:
Under the ten axioms of the theory of relativity as I have laid them out, i.e., its ten most
basic empirical propositions, there is only one that entails the Michelson result; it is only
this axiom then that is thereby threatened. The principle of the constancy of the speed
of light could be maintained in a more limited form even if the Michelson experiment’s
negative result were overturned. One could construct a ‘light geometry’ using light signals
but employing no rigid rods to maintain a metrical understanding of the world and allow the
previous formulation of all physical laws. From this perspective, the Michelson experiment
serves only as a bridge between the light geometry and the geometry of rigid rods. Should
this connection be lost, this would only mean that rigid rods do not after all possess the
preferred properties that Einstein still attributes to them. This would not mean a return to
the old aether theory, but rather a step towards the renunciation of a preferred system of
measurement in nature (Reichenbach, 1926b, 327; tr. 2006, 203).
Even after a positive result of the aether-drift experiments, one could still maintain the light
postulate, the claim that the motion of light is a spherical wave for any uniformly moving system,
by adopting a non-standard definition of simultaneity. However equal lengths measured by rods
and clocks would not be equal to equal lengths measured by light rays. Thus rods and clocks
would adjust to the classical light geometry, and not to relativistic one.
Reichenbach, in his role of the defender of Einstein’s theory, seems to have become more royal
than the king. What Reichenbach probably meant, is that the real philosophical achievement of
the theory is to have revealed a logical structure encoded in his axiomatization. Special relativity
has disentangled conceptual elements, which in the classical theory appeared confused. There are
empirical statements that serve as axioms (which can be true or false independently of it) and
definitions (which are neither true nor false). Light axioms can be true or false, but simultaneity
is a definition. In this sense Galilei and Lorentz transformations are neither true nor false, since
both agree on the light axioms and are different because of definition of simultaneity (Reichenbach,
1926b). The matter axiom can be true or false since it is a matter if they adapt to Lorentz or to
the Galilei transformations. This entire axiomatic structure, however, “is independent of specific,
physical observations” (Reichenbach, 1926b, -NoValue-; tr. 2006, -NoValue-) 203][328]. In other
terms, Miller’s experiment, if confirmed would disprove axiom VIII, but would not engender the
logical structure of Reichenbach’s axiomatization. It is true that such logical structure has been
derived “from a particular physical theory” (Reichenbach, 1926b, -NoValue-; tr. 2006, -NoValue-)
namely special relativity, but the latter has “given rise to philosophical insights which no longer
belong to the realm of physics but rather to the philosophy of nature” (Reichenbach, 1926b,
-NoValue-; tr. 2006, -NoValue-) 204][328].
1This claim is actually problematic (cf., e.g., Stachel, 1982; Dongen, 2009).
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In the meantime, Reichenbach thanks Max Planck’s and and Max von Laue’s support, had
obtained the chair for natural philosophy in Berlin (Reichenbach to Schlick, Jul. 2, 1926; Schlick
to Reichenbach, Jul. 5, 1926). Reichenbach clearly continued to consider the difference of this two
types of contractions important. An entry in Rudolf Carnap diaries, that he met Reichenbach
(near Berlin) on September 2, 1926: “He explained me the difference between Lorentz and
Einstein contractions” (RC 025-72-05). Carnap had just joined the Schlick circle in Vienna. The
philosophical disagreement between the Schlick-Circle and Reichenbach was deepening and went
beyond the specific issue of the philosophical interpretation of special relativity. Reichenbach was
convinced that the philosophy of nature should tackle metaphysical questions, such as that of
the reality of the external world or of the human freedom (Reichenbach, 1926c). By contrast,
Schlick, influenced by the young Carnap and Ludwig Wittgenstein deemed all such metaphysical
questions as non-sensical (Schlick, 1926).
We do not know whether Reichenbach ever became aware of Schlick’s negative opinion of
his interpretation of special relativity. However he clearly did not made any conciliatory steps:
Reichenbach’s line of argument can be found again in the Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre
(Reichenbach, 1928), which, as a letter from Reichenbach to Schlick reveals, was already finished
at the end of 1926 (Reichenbach to Schlick, Dec. 6, 1926; SN), though Reichenbach was only able
to find a publisher months later. When the book was finally published that the beginning of
1928 the importance of Miller’s experiment was fading away especially in Germany. According to
Reichenbach, “Michelson experiment has been confirmed to a very high degree” and he considered
“this matter closed” (Reichenbach, 1928, 225; tr. 1958, 195). A similar opinion was expressed by
Einstein in 1927 (Einstein, 1927). However Reichenbach still considered important to address
“erroneous interpretations in the usual discussions on relativity” (Reichenbach, 1928, 225; tr. 1958,
195) that the discussion of Miller’s experiment had revealed. In § 31 Reichenbach almost literally
repeats the content of the 1925 paper we started with, as if the discussion of Miller’s experiment
would force him to clarify an central issue of his interpretation of special relativity. However,
he also made some important clarifications. In particular he introduced his distinction between
Lorentz and Einstein contraction in terms of Minkowski diagrams.
5 Lorentz Contraction vs. Einstein Contraction in Terms of Minkowski Diagrams
5.1 Minkowski Space-Time as a Graphical Representation
Reichenbach had a somewhat deflationary attitude towards Minkowski space-time. He viewed
it as nothing but a ‘graphical representation,’ an expression he probably borrowed from Arthur
Stanley Eddington (1925b). Reichenbach defines ‘graphical representations’ as structural analogies
between different physical systems (e.g., compressed gases, electrical phenomena, mechanical
forces, rigid bodies and light rays, etc.), which are realizations of the same conceptual system
(e.g., the axioms of Euclidean geometry) (Reichenbach, 1928, 123ff; tr. 1958, 101ff).
In the case of Minkowski space-time, if “we speak of a geometrization of physical events, this
phrase should not be understood in some mysterious sense; it refers to the identity of types of
structure and not to the identity of the coordinated physical elements” (Reichenbach, 1928, 220;
tr. 1958, 190). By asserting that measuring rods, clocks, and light rays behave according to the
relations of congruence of the indefinite metric, Minkowski space-time provides the geometrical
representation of the light and matter axioms. When in fig. 3 we ‘symbolize,’ say, the motion of
rod OS with its rotation of the segment around O, “we only g[ive] a graphical representation,
which means that the logical structure [Beziehungsgefüge] exhibited by the rods [. . .] [c]an also be
realized by the space-time manifold” (Reichenbach, 1928, 220; tr. 1958, 190).
As Reichenbach put it, in Minkowski space-time a number ∆s is coordinated to the coordinate
differences ∆x1, . . . , ∆x4 by means of the fundamental metrical formula ∆s2 = ∆x21 + ∆x22 +
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Figure 3: Realization of the indefinite metric by means of light rays, clocks and measuring rods;
from Reichenbach, 1928, 215; the label S2 has been added
∆x23 −∆x24. The minus sign in the rule for computing real distances from coordinate distances
is responsible for all the differences between the Minkowski and Euclidean geometry. The lines
which are at a constant distance from the origin at ∆s satisfy the equation ∆x2 = ∆x21 −∆x24
rather than ∆x2 = ∆x21 +∆x24. The contour lines are hyperbolae, and not circles like in Euclidean
geometry. The four-hyperbolae in fig. 3, like the unit circle in Euclidean geometry, are the set
of all points at ∆s = 1 distance from O. The hyperbola ∆x2 = 0 degenerates into the two
asymptotes, which group all other events in space-time into three different classes of intervals
characterized by the sign of the quantity ∆s2. As one might expect, Reichenbach’s next step is to
find measuring instruments that behave like the indefinite type of metric, just like the behavior
of the rods correspond to the definite one.
The physical realization of the negative ∆s2 is a physical object that satisfies the relations of
congruence defined by the hyperbolas of quadrants I and II. The realization of the positive ∆s2 is
a physical object that satisfies the relations of congruence defined by the hyperbolas of quadrants
III and IV. The first is called a time-like interval ∆s2 = −1 and is realized by the proper time of a
clock. The rotation of the interval OQ into the position OQ′ represents a moving clock. ∆s2 = 1
is the space-like interval and is realized by the proper length of a rod. The rotation of interval
OS into OS′ sets the rod into motion. Light rays realize ∆s2 = 0, the limiting velocity, which
cannot be reached but only approached arbitrarily closely. Otherwise rods and clocks behave by
following the hyperbolic contour lines.
As Reichenbach rightly notices, there is a deep disanalogy between clocks and rods. Clocks
are intrinsically four-dimensional measuring instruments, since they measure distances between
two events. Measuring rods, on the other hand, are three-dimensional measuring instruments;
they can be treated as four-dimensional instruments, if events are produced at their endpoints
according to the appropriate definition of simultaneity (Reichenbach, 1928, 217; tr. 1958, 187). It
is from this difference that all difficulties arise concerning the behavior of rods.
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5.2 Lorentz vs. Einstein Contraction in Minkowski Space-Time
According to Reichenbach, resorting to the geometrical representation in fig. 3, one can easily
recognize the difference between Lorentz and Einstein contraction. In Minkowski space-time the
history of a uniformly moving unit rod is represented by a world-strip bounded by the parallel
world-lines of the rod’s endpoints. In the Lorentz-Einstein theory—keeping in mind that the
points on the hyperbolas are at distance 1 from O—the moving rod is represented by the narrower
strip between the world-lines OQ′ and S1S′; according to the classical theory it is represented by
the wider strip between OQ′ and SS′2. The Einstein contraction maintains that the moving rod
OS′ = 1 looks shorter from the perspective of the rest frame (OS1) than the proper length of the
rod OS = 1 (lKK′<lKK ). The Lorentz contraction refers to the fact that the classical length OS′2
would be longer than the relativistic proper length OS′ = 1, if both were measured in the same
moving frame (lK′K′<LK
′
K′) (Reichenbach, 1928, 225; tr. 1958, 195).
“This assertion of the theory of relativity is based mainly on the Michelson experiment”
(Reichenbach, 1928, 226; tr. 1958, 195). The Michelson experiment proves that material rods
satisfy the light-geometrical definition of congruence in all inertial systems. The matter-geometrical
equality of distances happens to coincide with the light-geometrical equality. In other terms,
rods set in motion behave according to the hyperbolic contour lines in quadrant IV. Consider
again fig. 1. OM1 and OM2 are regarded as equally long if light rays need equal time when they
are sent back and forth along OM1O and OM2O. The negative result of the Michelson-Morley
experiment establishes that if OM1 and OM2 are equally long if measured through light signals
(in terms of the absence of interference fringes), then small measuring rods that are placed along
the arms also mark off an equal number of segments on both arms:
(OM1O = OM2O)→ (OM1 = OM2) (i)
According to the classical theory, the implication eq. i is satisfied only in the ether frame. In
all other frames moving through the ether, the rest-length of the rod oriented in the direction
of motion will no longer satisfy the implication eq. i. If OM1 and OM2 are the arms of the
Michelson-Morley interferometer, then the fact that the matter-geometrical equality of distances
does not coincide with the light-geometrical equality is revealed empirically by the shift in the
patterns of light and darkness detected by the apparatus. The Lorentz-Einstein theory claims
that the implication eq. i is satisfied in all frames; the light-geometrical distance always coincides
with the matter-geometrical distance in all inertial systems. Light geometry is the same in both
cases.
Thus, both Einstein and Lorentz’s theories assume that the proper length of the arm of the
Michelson apparatus lying in the direction of motion is shorter than it would be according to the
classical theory. An objection that immediately comes to mind is that it is impossible to compare
two magnitudes belonging to different theories, since there is no common standard of comparison.
However, according to Reichenbach, his axiomatization provides the common standard: “In this
case, the tertium comparationis is light, which in terms of light-geometrical definitions supplies a
standard to which the rods of the different theories can be compared” (Reichenbach, 1928, 197;
tr. 1958, 228). The hyperbola in quadrant IV (fig. 3) defines the distance 1 from O. Rods in
motion, that is, rotated around O, follow the hyperbolas in the Lorentz-Einstein theory, but they
do not do so in the classical theory. In this way, in Reichenbach’s view, it is possible to compare
rods I and L, though only one of them has an actual physical existence.
Thus, the Lorentz contraction is a real difference, just as the pressure of gas is really lower
according to van der Waals equation than it would be according to the ideal gas equation. This
does not mean that Einstein contraction is ‘apparent.’ Reichenbach prefers to speak of a metrogenic
or (since motion is implied) metrokinematic difference: it depends on the fact that two observers
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in relative motion measure two different three-dimensional cross-sections of the world-strip of
the rod; thus it is a ‘perspectival difference’ (Reichenbach, 1928, 228–229; tr. 1958, 197). The
Michelson experiment implies a real difference between the classical theory and Einstein’s theory,
as well as between the classical theory and Lorentz’s theory. But there is no difference between
Einstein’s and Lorentz’s theories: “The concept of simultaneity does not enter into this problem
at all” (Reichenbach, 1928, 229; tr. 1958, 198).
In geometrical terms, the Einstein contraction compares the width of different three-dimensional
simultaneity cross-sections of the same relativistic world-strip (it is a perspectival difference);
the Lorentz contraction compares the width of same three-dimensional cross-section of different
world-strips (it is a real difference). Figure 3 reflects the fact that in the classical theory there is
neither a Einstein nor a Lorentz contraction (OS = OS2 = OS′2). In the Lorentz-Einstein theory
the Einstein contraction is Lorentz contraction (OS′1 < OS′2 → OS1 < OS). However, the two
contractions are not identical.
This is essential to understand “[w]hat is the difference between Einstein’s and Lorentz’s
theories” (Reichenbach, 1928, 229; tr. 1958, 198). In order to answer this question Reichenbach
distinguishes between the following two statements (Reichenbach, 1928, 229; tr. 1958, 198):
1. the length of the moving rod lKK′ measured from the rest frame is different from its proper
length lKK . As is well known, the proper length is greater than any coordinate length; the
difference disappears only for the co-moving observer.
2. the rest-length of the moving rod lK′K′ is different from the rest-length of another rod LK
′
K′
which moves with it but satisfies the classical theory. The relativistic proper length in the
moving frame is shorter than the classical length would be as judged from the same frame.
In Reichenbach’s view, (b) can either be ‘true’ or ‘false’ in both Lorentz and Einstein’s
theories, depending on whether one accepts, say, Michelson or Miller’s experimental results. In
the geometrical representation, it is indicated by the difference between the distances lK′K′ = OS′
and LK′K′ = OS′2 (fig. 3). On the contrary, (a) is neither ‘true’ nor ‘false’; it depends on the
definition of simultaneity adopted (one can choose the standard Einsteinian definition or an
alternative one). In the geometrical representation, statement (a) is equivalent to the comparison
of lKK = OS and lKK′ = OS′. Lorentz believed that lengths mentioned in (a) are different because
the lengths mentioned in (b) are: the lengths of the arms of the interferometer are equally long
only in the ether frame. On the contrary, Einstein declared the lengths mentioned in (a) are equal
if measured at relative rest: the proper lengths of the arms of the interferometer are the same in
all inertial frames (Reichenbach, 1928, 229–230; tr. 1958, 198–199). Reichenbach, however, made
a further statement embodying the peculiarity of his approach: “It is sometimes overlooked by
proponents of the theory of relativity that statement (b) is nevertheless true” (Reichenbach, 1928,
230; tr. 1958, 198) in Einstein’s theory as well.
Thus Einstein’s theory, just like Lorentz’s, implies a contraction that is independent of the
relativity of simultaneity, namely, the Lorentz contraction that implies a comparison of lengths
lK
′
K′ < L
K′
K′ , i.e., OS′ < OS′2 in the same moving frame but in different theories. In addition,
however, it contains the Einstein contraction, which compares lengths in the same theory: the
proper length and the coordinate length lKK′ < lKK , i.e., OS < OS1. As we have seen, Reichenbach
maintained the opinion that the two contractions only happen to amount to the same Lorentz
factor as a consequence of the linearity of the Lorentz transformations. The numerical identity
OS1 : OS = OS′ : OS′2 is coincidental and it conceals a deeper conceptual difference.
Reichenbach repeats the proof of this statement, as it appeared in his 1925 article (Reichenbach,
1928, 230f.; tr. 1958, 199f.); however, in order to emphasize the difference between the two
contractions, he constructs a counterexample in which an ‘Einstein contraction’ appears but there
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is no ‘Lorentz contraction.’ The example is based on the possibility of using Einstein’s definition
of simultaneity or an alternative one ( 6= 1/2) in the classical theory (Reichenbach, 1928, 231;
tr. 1958, 200). Reichenbach’s conclusion can be understood without entering into too much detail:
The example [. . .] [m]akes it particularly clear that the Einstein contraction is a metrogenic
phenomenon. In the geometrical representation this means that we may choose as the length
of the rod differently directed sections through the world-strip of the rod. On the other hand,
the geometrical representation of [fig. 3] shows very clearly that through the difference in the
width of the strip, the Lorentz contraction indicates a difference in the actual behavior of the
rod. These considerations also explain how it is possible to compare rods I and L, although
only one of them is physically realized. OS is the same in both theories; the classical theory
claims that the right-hand boundary of the strip parallel to OQ′ must be drawn through
S, whereas the new theory places the boundary along the tangent to the hyperbola which
passes through S′ (Reichenbach, 1928, 232; tr. 1958, 200).
Thus it is correct to claim that the Einstein contraction does not require any physical
explanation; it is a metrogenic difference between proper and coordinate length. However,
Lorentz’s contraction does cry out for such an explanation. The negative result of the Michelson
experiment implies that rods of all materials invariably behave in agreement with distances
measured by light rays. How can such a coincidence be explained?
As we have seen, for Reichenbach, Weyl’s expression ‘adjustment’ aptly expresses the need
for an explanation, but it provides no details as to what it would look like. “The answer can
of course be given only by a detailed theory of matter, of which we have not the least idea”
(Reichenbach, 1928, 233; tr. 1958, 201; translation modified). It is important to emphasize that
this is not a marginal aspect of Reichenbach’s philosophy. According to Reichenbach the very
same problem emerges in general relativity when the non-Euclidean nature of the continuum is
taken into account. In this case, too, he resorts to the expression ‘adjustment’ and he refers his
readers to the very same §31 of the book.
In general relativity measuring instruments in a gravitational field should also be considered
‘free from deforming forces,’ and not deviating from the Euclidean expected behavior; nevertheless
one may still seek an explanation for why all measuring instruments happen to agree on the same,
generally non-Euclidean, geometry. According to Reichenbach, in general relativity, too, only a
theory of matter can explain this peculiar behavior of the space-time measuring instruments. In
the presence of a real gravitational field it is impossible to arrange rods and clocks in a rectangular
grid, just like it is impossible to ‘develop’ a flat piece of paper around a sphere. “We know that a
more detailed investigation would reveal the presence of molecular force-fields, which affect the
molecules on the surface of the sphere and thus force it into a definite” (Reichenbach, 1928, 295;
tr. 1958, 258) congruence relationship.
Conclusion
The interest Miller’s results in the faded away 1930s. The two great experimentalist of their time,
Miller and Charles Edward St. John (St. John, 1932), discussed the issue the April 1930 at the
NAS meeting (Lalli, 2012, 4.3). Miller replied defending his position Miller, 1933. However the
Kennedy-Thordlike experiment Kennedy and Thorndike, 1932 settled the questioned, and special
relativity was further confirmed by the Ives-Stilwell experiment (Ives and Stilwell, 1938, 1941) in
spite of Charles Ives’ intentions (Lalli, 2013). Miller results were considered inexplicable until in
1954, when Robert Shankland (1955), who also discussed the matter with Einstein (Shankland,
1963), put forward an explanation of Miller’s data which is usually accepted, even if not universally
(Lalli, 2012).
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From the point of view of the history of philosophy of science, Miller’s experiment played the
role of a litmus test. It revealed how different was the conception of the relationship between
special relativity and the Lorentz theory. Schlick reacted as expected rehearsing his conventionalist
position. The difference between Lorentz and Einstein theory is conventional. The superiority of
Einstein’s theory is depend on the fact that the Einstein’s theory entails less redundant elements,
in particular no ad hoc molecular dynamical contraction of the rods. Reichenbach was forced to
reveal some more striking consequences of his axiomatization program. By separating Einstein
and Lorentz contraction, Reichenbach considered the contraction of rods regarded as a physically
‘real’ contraction, in the sense that in both theories rods behaves differently than in the classical
theory. Einstein’s and Lorentz’s theories do not differ in this respect. In both cases a ‘molecular’
explanation of the contraction is needed. If Lorentz erroneously conceived of the explanation as a
deviation caused by a force, Einstein proved negligent by avoiding any explanation. What has to
be explained in not the reciprocal Einstein contraction, but the Lorentz contraction, that is the
very fact that measurment made by material structures always agree with measurement made by
light rays.
The distinction between two type of contractions, which is seldom mentioned in recent
Reichenbach’s scholarship, enjoyed renewed success in 1950s, just after Reichenbach’s death in
1953. Adolf Grünbaum reintroduced it in a paper written in 1955 (Grünbaum, 1955). Grünbaum
warned from a ‘widespread error’ to consider the ‘the Lorentz-Fitzgerald contraction hypothesis
was an ad hoc explanation,’ and whereas Einstein that show it to be a consequence of the relativity
of simultaneity. According to Grünbaum this “error is inspired by the numerical equality of the
contraction factors of these two kinds of contraction” (Grünbaum, 1955, 460) . Both special
relativity and Lorentz theory presupposes the Lorentz contraction: “using light as the standard
for effecting the comparison, this hypothesis affirms that in the same system and under the
same conditions of measurement, the metrical properties of the arm are different from the ones
predicted by classical ether theory” (Grünbaum, 1955, 460) . This has nothing to do with a
comparison of the length of the two arms in two different frames. Grünbaum mentions only
at the end of the paper that his “treatment of several of the issues is greatly indebted to two
outstanding works on the philosophy of relativity by Hans Reichenbach, which are not available
in English” (Grünbaum, 1955, 460) .
The translation of Reichenbach’s book was published (Reichenbach, 1958). A year later, the
English translation (Popper, 1959) of Popper’s Logik der Forschung (Popper, 1935) also appeared
in print. Just thereafter, Grünbaum made implicit use of Reichenbach’s account against Popper’s
claim that the Lorentz contraction is ad hoc Grünbaum (1959). In response to Popper, Grünbaum
(1959) drew attention to the 1932 Kennedy-Thorndike experiment, which would disprove Lorentz
contraction, if the theory is not supplemented with a clock retardation hypothesis. Grünbaum
shows that this ‘doubly-amended theory’ can account for all optical experiments that supports
special relativity, the Michelson- Morley experiment, the Kennedy-Thorndike experiment, and the
Ives-Stillwell experiment. Further modifications can be introduced to account for electromagnetic
kind of ether-drift experiments (Janssen, 1995). A few years later, Grünbaum implemented this
line of reasoning his classical monograph on space and time Philosophical Problems of Space
and Time. The distinction was also used by Carlo Giannoni (1971, 1978) and with a different
nomenclature by Dennis Dieks (1984).
In Reichenbach’s view both Lorentz and Einstein theory start with recognition of the odd
coincidence that field geometry and matter geometry always agree. This odd coincidence requires
an explanation. Lorentz theory, according to Reichenbach provided the wrong kind of explanation,
however, Einstein’s theory superficially got away without providing one. In the mainstream
interpretation it was Minkowski that, so to say, provided the missing explanation, i.e. the
geometrical structure space-time (Janssen, 2009). On the contrary, Reichenbach surprisingly
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adopted a sort of neo-Lorentzian approach (Brown, 2005), claiming the explanation should have
been sought in a future theory of matter. The ‘geometrical’ explanation is rigid: a negative
result of a Miller’s experiment would have made the entire theory collapse, since the geometrical
structure of space-time enters in the formulation of all laws of nature. The ‘material’ explanation
is flexible: the laws of governing matter happen to agree with laws governing the fields, but do
not need to do so. The positive result of an ether-drift experiment would have simply implied a
readjustment in their reciprocal relationship. In this way, however, the ‘material explanation’
turns out to be simply the restatement of a matter of fact, that is no explanation at all.
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